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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
could be completed by the new Board." In addition, the law created a Division
of Equalization and Assessment which Was to carry out, the policies of the
permanent Board12 and into which all officers and employees of the temporary
Board should be transferred.'3
It is clear that the essential purpose of the statute was to effect the
transfer of the powers and duties of the temporary Board to the permanent
Board. Nowhere in the statute is it stated that the temporary board members
should continue to exercise rate-making power in the absence of their appoint-
ment to the new Board. Nor does such authority arise by implication. The
majority, recognizing that this implication cannot be found in the statute, and
realizing a contrary decision would create chaos in the tax system, chose to
read into the statute an ambiguity, and justified the interpretive procedure
by cloaking it in a protective mantle of legislative intent. Such a procedure is
unjustified when the statute, as in the instant case, is clear.
R. J. D.
TEACHER TENURE-WAIVER
After a meeting of the local school board, a teacher was dismissed without
written charges and a hearing as required by N.Y. Education Law, section
3013. The school agreed to pay the teacher's salary for the duration of the
school year and to give her a letter of recommendation for a new teaching
position in return for the teacher's waiving her right to a hearing under the
Education Law. The teacher after having accepted the salary and waiting an
additional two years sought a statutory hearing and back pay. The school
board appealed from an Appellate Division ruling in favor of the teacher.'
Held: affirmed, with two judges dissenting, because Education Law section
3013 forbids a waiver for consideration by a teacher to written charges and a
hearing, as contrary to the avowed public policy of giving a substantial degree
of permanency to the jobs of experienced teachers. To admit otherwise, the
Court added, would permit local school boards to fashion public policy as
they see fit. The Court also held that the paying of a teacher's salary for not
teaching is in violation of the N.Y. Constitution, as an unconstitutional gift
of public monies. *Boyd v. Collins, 11 N.Y.2d 228, 182 N.E.2d 610, 228
N.Y.S.2d 228 (1962).
No prior relevant case law deals with the question. Although there is a
limited prohibition against waiver in section 96 of the Civil Service Law, it is
applicable only to "candidates for employment." No similar prohibition is
found in the Education Law. It would seem to follow from the instant case that
since the agreement was void, as a matter of law, there was an unconstitu-
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 335, § 16.
12. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 201.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 335, § 11.
1. 14 A.D.2d 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 203 (3d Dep't 1961).
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tional gift of public monies. If, however, an agreement of this nature were
valid, the New York constitutional provision relating to gifts of public monies
would not be violated since a local unit of government may exchange its
property for a valid consideration. 2 Thus in cases, excluding waiver, such as
a voluntary agreement to resign, school boards have flexibility in bargaining
power with teachers and the community. After a probationary period in the
school system, a person may be appointed to tenure by a Board of Education
upon recommendation of the District Superintendent of Schools. Once on
tenure, a teacher holds this position "during good behavior and efficient service";
but may be removed upon the presentation of written charges and a hearing by
the local Board of Education. 3
The Court of Appeals summarily disposed of the matter on the ground
that the teacher never entered a voluntary agreement to resign, but that for
a consideration she waived her rights to charges and a hearing. Such a waiver
is contrary to public policy and any attempt to effect it is invalid. To allow
such a waiver would destroy the very purpose of the tenure statutes, i.e., to
give security to competent members of the educational system in the position
to which they have been appointed.4 The Court emphatically declared that
the paying of a teacher's salary for not teaching is a violation of the New
York State Constitution. 5 The dissent differed substantially with the statutory
interpretation of the majority and said that such a right to charges could be
waived by the teacher. It argued that a high degree of administrative flexibility
should be allowed the school board provided it is properly exercised.
The Court in laying down a prohibition against tampering with the stat-
utory method of removing teachers is aiming its judicial arrows at any attempts
by a local school board to use a waiver agreement as a weapon of intimidation,
coercion, or discipline against an innocent teacher. With the privilege of
waiver allowed, school boards could deceive teachers into signing away their
"fundamental rights" based on prefabricated and exaggerated evidence. The
stability of the statutory procedure provides a secure and equitable method
of removing undesirable teachers and adequately reflects the intent of the
legislature in drafting the law. There are, however, tenable arguments for
allowing a waiver agreement. This process could be a convenient way for all
concerned to avoid community scandal. A teacher, who would rather accept
a compromise, is required to submit to a rigorous public hearing. There is no
compulsion in signing a waiver, and the teacher may well be acting freely for
her own benefit. Finally, there is always court review of the agreement on
2. Ross v. Wilson, 284 App. Div. 522, 132 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't 1954), rev'd other
grounds, 308 N.Y. 605, 127 N.E.2d 697 (1955).
3. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3013.
4. See Monan v. Board of Education, 280 App. Div. 14, 111 N.Y.S.2d 797 (4th Dep't
1952); Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787 (1953).
5. N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 1: "No county, city, town, village or school district shall
give or loan money or property to or in the aid of any individual . .. ."
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both the theories of contract and the abuse of discretion by the school board.
Broad proclamations of public policy may often place the law in rigid straits
which on the surface seem to protect a class of citizens, but upon closer
analysis subvert the very foundations of necessary free choice. The Court,
however, has, by its strict interpretation of the statute, placed free choice
in the background to ensure that local action which may be prejudicial, arbi-
trary, and capricious will not be used to undermine the confidence, security,
and morale of the teaching profession.
W. A. C.
ARBITRATION
APPOINTEES ON TRIPARTITE ARBITRATION BOARD ALLOWED To BE PARTIAL. TO
THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES W11o SELECT THmv
Defendant, a non-profit corporation organized under the Insurance Laws
of New York, entered into contracts with various partnerships of physicians,
whereby the latter supplied medical assistance to the insurer's customers.
Payment to the doctors was initially a fixed sum with an additional supple-
mental payment depending on criteria and standards both parties were to fix
in the future. In the event that the parties failed to arrive at these criteria,
the question was to be submitted to a tripartite arbitration board, each party
selecting an arbitrator and a third chosen by the two appointees. Subsequently,
the parties failed to agree. Defendant selected one of its Board of Directors
as its appointed arbitrator. Plaintiff moved to disqualify him on the grounds
of personal bias, interest and partiality and to have appellant substitute an
impartial arbitrator. Special Term granted the motion which was affirmed by
the Appellate Division and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.1
Held: reversed with three judges dissenting. Although a court could intervene
in an appropriate case and disqualify an arbitrator before an award has been
rendered, a member of a board of directors of a corporate party was not dis-
qualified to act as the party's nominated arbitrator solely because of this
relationship. Tripartite arbitration is implicitly partisan in nature. In the
Matter of Astoria Medical Group, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 182 N.E.2d 85, 227 N.Y.S.2d
401 (1962).
Arbitration is a method of adjudication of differences which parties, by
consent, substitute for usual processes provided by law.2 Parties to an arbitra-
tion contract are completely free to agree upon the identity of the arbitrators
and the manner in which they are chosen.3 The law recognizes the arbitration
contract of the parties, and courts will not vary its terms but will implement
1. 13 A.D.2d 288, 216 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dep't 1961).
2. Cf. Cross and Brown Co. v. Nelson, 4 A.D.2d 501, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1st Dep't
1957).
3. See N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 1452.
